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Abstract. In this paper, the impact of endogenous information provision to 
drivers in road transport is investigated. A static economic equilibrium model is 
used, which allows potential road users to buy information on the prevailing 
(stochastic) traffic situation. It takes for granted that an indiviual will try to ac- 
quire proper information when the private benefits of doing so exceed the private 
costs. By using an information model for road users, the interesting result is 
found that the provision of endogenous information leads to a strict Pareto im- 
provement. Furthermore, the model shows that - depending on the price of in- 
formation - it can be efficiency improving to subsidise or tax the motorist infor- 
mation to the user. Finally, there is a relationship between fine congestion pricing 
and subsidising motorist information. It turns out that the social welfare max- 
imising subsidy under first-best congestion pricing is equal to zero. However, sub- 
sidising information may be an attractive policy instrument when a fiat conges- 
tion pricing scheme is preferred. 
1. Introduction 
Traffic congestion is one of the most pressing transportation problems, particular 
in urban areas. The negative impacts of congestion are not strictly confined to 
the transportation sector, but are affecting the economy as a whole. Various ways 
to resolve (part of) the congestion problem in the transport sector have been ad- 
dressed in the literature. ~In the present paper we will focus on one of these solu- 
t There is a large body of literature on congestion i transport networks. For useful references see 
Arnott et al. (1993), and Johansson and Mattsson (1995). 
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tion strategies: the provision of information to improve the efficiency of road 
usage. This tool is becoming increasingly more important as more traditional 
ways of resolving the congestion problem (such as expansion of the existing road 
network) are viewed as infeasible, due to the negative social and environmental 
consequences (Boyce 1988). 
Research assessing the effects of these new information technologies has 
usually focused on (1) the technical feasibility (witness the many technical pro- 
jects within the European Community DRIVE I and II programme); (2) the im- 
pact on driver behaviour using a wide variety of methodologies (Bonsall (1992); 
Emmerink et al. (1996); Kobayashi (1994); Lotan and Koutsopoulos (1993); Yang 
et al. (1993)); and (3) the impact on the efficiency of road usage (see, for example, 
Emmerink et al. (1995a), and Mahmassani and Jayakrishnan (1991)). 
In the present paper, the latter issue using a static economic equilibrium 
model, in which individual decisions are interdependent due to a congestion exter- 
nality, is investigated. Tomodel the large and often unpredictable random fluctua- 
tions in levels of congestion, the link travel cost functions are assumed to be ran- 
dom variables. Two types of actors are being considered: informed and unin- 
formed ones. Informed actors are assumed to have perfect knowledge on the 
realisation of these random variables, and are therefore basing their trip-making 
decision on actual costs. Uninformed actors, in contrast, do not have this infor- 
mation, and hence base their behaviour on expected costs. However, in contrast 
to previous work (Emmerink et al. 1994 a, 1995 b), we assume that there are costs 
associated with information provision which reflect, for instance, the costs of the 
necessary information technology equipment. In this manner, the choice of being 
informed is modelled endogenously, whereas in previous papers this process was 
modelled as an exogenous inpuL Hence, an actor in the present model does not 
only decide on whether or not to use the transport network, but also decides upon 
whether to buy information on the traffic situation. Clearly, an actor will buy the 
information only if the private benefits of being informed at least exceed the 
private costs of doing so. 
This model will also be used to examine the efficiency improving properties 
of two types of government regulation. First, we will consider the possible im- 
plications of subsidising the costs of information for social welfare. The idea is 
that owing to the external benefits generated by the information to uninformed 
actors, it may be attractive for the government (or an infrastructure authority) to 
subsidise information (Emmerink et al. 1994b) and we will analyse under which 
conditions it is socially desirable for the government to do so. Next, we will inves- 
tigate the link between fine congestion pricing and endogenous provision of infor- 
mation. Fine congestion pricing will yield its first-best characteristic, only if the 
users of the system are perfectly aware of the prevailing fine congestion toll. 
Without perfect information on actual levels of congestion and tolls, users would 
base their behaviour on expected costs rather than on actual costs. Therefore, it
seems logical to consider the efficiency of first-best congestion tolling in com- 
bination with the endogenous provision of perfect information. With respect to 
the second point, we will elaborate the analysis of E1 Sanhouri (1994) and Verhoef 
et al. (1994), who assumed that infbrmation is available for free, both for all ac- 
tors and for the government. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we will first present 
a version of a model in which information ismodelled exogenously. In Sect. 3 we 
will turn to the case where the choice of being informed is endogenous, while the 
above mentioned regulatory issues are treated in Sect. 4. Finally, Sect. 5 contains 
the conclusions. 
2. Exogenous demand for information 
First we will present he model in which the choice of being informed is an ex- 
ogenous input. The polar cases of (1) all drivers and (2) no driver being informed 
will be presented in order to be able to identify the factors underlying the (de- 
rived) demand for information. We will first assume that all drivers are perfectly 
informed on the stochastic onditions in a one-link network. The demand func- 
tion for road usage is given by D, and stochasticity is introduced by means of 
uncertainty in terms of the link travel cost function. There are two link travel cost 
functions giving the private costs of road use: one representing so-called recurrent 
congestion (a link travel cost function C o for state 0), and one representing non- 
recurrent or stochastic ongestion (a link travel cost function C I for state 1). It 
is assumed that state 1 implies both relatively high link travel costs and relatively 
high congestion costs. Hence, the relationship: 
C°(N)<_Ct (N)  and OC°(N)<_ OCI(N) (i) 
ON ON 
holds for all feasible levels of road usage N. It is further assumed that state 0 takes 
place with probability 1-p, while state t occurs with probability p. 
When drivers are perfectly informed on the prevailing state, they will adjust 
their travel choice decision according to this knowledge. This situation might, for 
instance, be visualised by a motorist information device that provides perfect in- 
formation to individuals equipped with the technology. Given the static 
equilibrium nature of the model, the type of information given can best be inter- 
preted as pre-trip information. 
The model is presented in expressions (2) and (3), and is fully in line with 
generally accepted economic theory stating that an informed individual will use 
the network if private benefits exceed private costs. Moreover, this conforms to 
Wardrop's first principle (see Wardrop (1952)) for the user equilibrium, as both 
may be characterized by individual maximizing behaviour. In expressions (2) and 
(3), a subscript ex (exogenous) refers to the fact that information is exogenously 
provided to all actors, and superscripts 0 and 1 refer to the two possible states (0: 
low link travel costs; 1: high link travel costs). 
0 0 0 0 > 0 0 0 0 D(Nex)<-C (Nex) Nex-O and , Nex ' (D(Nex) -C  (Nex)) = 0 (2) 
D(NIex)<CI(N~x) ~ 1 l l , Nex ' (D(Nex) -C  (N~ex)) 0 (3) - Nex >- 0 and = 
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For the present discussion it is important o focus on the internal and external 
benefits and costs of information provision. Internal information benefits are 
benefits owing to better decision-making by the informed river himself, while ex- 
ternal information benefits to an arbitrary driver arise from the fact that other 
road users are being informed on the traffic situation. 
For obtaining the internal and external benefits and costs of information pro- 
vision, we have to derive the model in which no information is available. In this 
model it is assumed that all (potential) road users base their behaviour on ex- 
pected link travel costs rather than on prevailing costs. Hence, uninformed rivers 
may be characterized as frequent commuters who are familiar with the average 
traffic conditions. This model is presented in expression (4). 
D(Nn)<_(1 -p) 'C°(Nn)+p'Cl (Nn)  , Nn>-O 
Nn'(D(Nn)- ((1 -p  )" C° (Nn) +p" C 1 (Am))) = 0 
and 
(4) 
Here, subscript n (no information) refers to the model without information. For 
a more rigorous analysis of the above type of models we refer to Emmerink et 
al. (1994a). In their study it was, inter alia, shown that information provision to 
an exogenously determined fraction of potential road users leads to a strict Pareto 
improvement, see Fig. i. 
The internal and external benefits and costs of information provision are 
depicted in Figs. 1 and 2. In these figures, a link travel cost symbol C without 
superscript denotes the expected link travel costs (C= (1-p)C°+pCI) ,  and 
should be evaluated at the relevant equilibrium level of trip demand, for example, 
Cex = (1 -p )  C°(N°e x) +pC 1 (Nix). 
Figure 1 demonstrates the property that information provision will lead to a 
strict Pareto improvement. I formation benefits for all drivers are non-negative, 
and positive for those on the left-hand side of N°x. Next, in Fig. 2 the informa- 
tion benefits (and costs) are separated out over the two possible states of nature. 
First, consider the left-hand panel of Fig. 2. As discussed in Emmerink et al. 
(t994a), in state 0, drivers on the left-hand side of N n incur additional external 
congestion costs due to the information provided (when information is provided 
there are more drivers using the network in state 0), while drivers between ~,~ 
Net Private Benefits 
C,- Ce~ N 
N 1 N.  N ° ex  
Fig. 1. Expected net private benefits 
from information 
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Fig. 2. Welfare ffects of information 
and NO incur internal decision-making benefits (when information is provided 
these drivers do not use the network). Alternatively, when state 1 is prevailing (the 
right-hand panel), drivers to the left-hand side of Nelx benefit from an external 
decrease in congestion costs, while those between Nlex and N n benefit both from 
an external decrease in congestion costs and internal decision-making benefits. 
Although the first of the effects mentioned above is clearly negative, the other ef- 
fects are all positive, and it can be shown that the total impact of in~brmation pro- 
vision on overall welfare is non-negative, as illustrated in Fig. 1 and formally 
proved in Emmerink et al. (1994a). 
3. Endogenous demand for information 
Thus far, we have assumed that the decision of being informed is exogenous, i.e. 
is not determined within the model. In this section we will present a model in 
which the choice of being informed is endogenous, and dependent on the internal 
benefits that an informed individual derives from the information. 
3.1. The model 
In the previous section we have seen that there are two kinds of information 
benefits, internal and external. In the model to be presented hereafter, we will 
assume that an individual decides to be informed when the internal benefits of 
information exceed the private costs of being informed. It is rational to consider 
the internal benefits only, because for an arbitrary individual the externalbenefits 
are (by definition) independent of whether or not that particular individual is 
himself informed. These external benefits (and costs) are caused by the fact that 
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other road users are informed on the prevailing traffic situation. This observation 
implies that only drivers between Nlex and Ne ° are potentially interested in being 
informed, since these are the ones that may incur internal benefits from the infor- 
mation. Drivers at the left-hand side of N~x are not interested, since they will use 
the road network regardless the prevailing state, whereas drivers to the right-hand 
side of NO are not interested since they will use the network in neither state. 
Now consider driver N o* in the left-hand panel of Fig. 2, where the subscript 
en (endogenous) refers to the model in which the demand for information is en- 
dogenous. If for this driver the internal benefits of being supplied with informa- 
tion exceed the costs, then the same holds for all drivers between N n and Nen°*, 
since for these drivers internal benefits are larger than those of driver 0, Nen. A 
similar reasoning holds for driver Nel, * in the right-hand panel of Fig. 2. If  it is 
beneficial for this particular driver to be informed, then this is the case for all 
the drivers between N~n* and N n. Therefore, if we denote the marginally in- 
formed driver (the driver who is indifferent between being informed or not) on 
the left-hand side of N n with N~,, and the marginally informed driver on the 
right-hand side of N,  with 0 Nen , then in equilibrium 0 Nen-Nen drivers are in- 
formed. 
The resulting network situation in the model with endogenous demand can 
now be characterised as follows. First, the informed drivers (those between Nlen 
and N°n) will only use the network when state 0 is prevailing, and will thus fully 
benefit from their internal decision-making benefits. Second, drivers on the left- 
hand side of Nein will not buy the motorist information equipment, and will 
always use the transport network. This can easily be seen by noting that they 
would do the same in case no information was available for equipped rivers. 
Finally, drivers to the right-hand side of NOn will not buy the motorist informa- 
tion equipment and will use the network in neither state. 
In order to determine Ne ° and 1 Nen , we need of course the price of informa- 
tion. Due to the static equilibrium nature of the model, the price of information 
zr to be considered below is short of any time dimension. In other words, whereas 
one would intuitively think of rc as an individual investment, he internal benefits 
of which were to be reaped during a subsequent (large) number of travel decisions, 
such reasoning is not in the spirit of static equilibrium analysis. Hence, for the 
translation of the present model into more practical terms, one should either in- 
terpret he diagrams in Figs. 1 and 2 as daily cost and benefit curves and u as the 
daily equivalent of some purchase pr ice/7  (where z~ reflects daily interest and 
depreciation), or one could consider 7~ as the real purchase price and take D and 
C to be some discounted measures of the future stream of benefits and costs of 
road usage. 
The mathematical formulation of the model is presented below. Since, by 
definition, the marginally informed driver is indifferent between being informed 
or not, the following two relationships should hold: 
(1 -p ) . (D(N° , ) -C° (N° . ) )  = (5) 
p. (C 1 (Nlen)-D(Nlen)) = zc (6) 
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where n denotes the private costs of information. The term in the large paren- 
theses in expression (5) gives the internal decision-making benefits for the 
marginally informed driver NeOn in state 0. Hence, the expected internal decision- 
making benefits are given by multiplying this term with the probability hat state 
0 occurs. The left-hand side of expression (6) gives the expected internal decision- 
making benefits for a marginally informed driver N~en. Obviously, the expected 
internal decision-making benefits of the marginally informed river should equal 
the private costs of information . 
Also, notice that for both N°, and 1 Nen, expressions (5) and (6) guarantee that 
the expected net private benefits of the marginally uninformed driver and 
marginally informed driver are the same, and equal to 0 for N O and equal to eg/ '  
(1-p)(D(N~n)-D(N°en)) for Neln. Therefore, both the marginally informed 
driver NOn and Nlen are indifferent in buying the information. 
To derive the properties of the model discussed above, we will assume that 
both the demand and cost curves are linear functions over the relevant ranges con- 
sidered, i.e. D (N) = d -aN and CJ(N) = k J+ b in  for j = 0, t. 2 Then solving for 
NOn and N~n in expressions (5) and (6) yields: 
d-k  ° n n NOn = - NO (7) 
a+b ° (1 -p) . (a+b °) (1 -p) . (a+b °) 
d -k  1 n n 1 1 Nen - ~ - Nex q (8) a+b I p. (a+b 1) p. (a+b 1) 
where n is in the interval [0, 7Eraax ] to ensure that N~, is smaller than Ne ° .  3 The 
first term on the right-hand side of expression (7) [(8)] gives the number of in- 
formed drivers using the network in state 0 (state 1), in case the information were 
provided for free. The second term on the right-hand side of these expressions 
captures the effect of the price of information. 
The proposition below presents ome of the properties of the model with en- 
dogenised emand for information compared to the model in which no informa- 
tion is available. 
Proposition. In a one-link network with endogenised demand for information, 
and assuming linear demand (D) and cost (C ° C 1) functions, C°(N) <__ C 1 (N), 
and dC° (N)/dN<_ dC 1 (N)/dN, the following relationships hold: 
• expected road usage is higher with information than without; 
• expected link travel costs are smaller with information than without; 
• expected welfare is higher with information than without. 
Proof See Appendix A.l. 
2 It is interesting tonote that Arnott, DePalma and Lindsey (1992) showed that these cost func- 
tions include asa special case the reduced form of Vickrey's dynamic bottleneck model. 
3 See Appendix A.1 for a derivation f nma x. 
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Fig. 3. Difference in expected net private benefits of the model with endogenous demand for informa- 
tion and the model in which no information is available 
The net private benefits o f  endogenous provision of  information compared to the 
situation in which no information is available are depicted in Fig. 3. Drivers on 
the left-hand side of  Nlen benefit from an external decrease in congestion costs of  
the size Cn minus Cen, where Cm (m = n, en) denotes the expected link travel costs 
in model m. Drivers between Nlen and N n benefit in addition from internal deci- 
sion-making benefits owing to the purchased information. Finally, drivers be- 
tween N n and NOn benefit from internal decision-making benefits solely. 
Using the equilibrium levels o f  road usage as given by expressions (7) and (8) 
when the private costs of  being provided with information are equal to n, we can 
derive the demand curve for information. Given a price of  information of  n, NOn 
minus N~en drivers would like to be supplied with information. Therefore, the 
relationship between the number of  informed drivers and the private costs of  in- 
formation is given by: 4 
+ D-~(n)=N~ex-Nex -n" l_p)f(a+b o) p-(a+b t) (9) 
The term in large parentheses multiplied by the costs of  being equipped with a 
motorist information device n denotes the number of  drivers for whom the costs 
4 Strictly speaking, the notation D - t may be a bit confusing as (9) gives the actual demand curve, 
and not its inverse. However, as we used D before todenote inverse demand (in line with common 
practice), we have to live with this slight inconvenience. 
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of information exceed the internal benefits of being informed. The term N°ex 
minus N~x reflects the number of drivers who are interested in being informed 
when the information is provided for free. 
3.2. Welfare effects 
Next, we will explore the welfare properties of the model with endogenous de- 
mand for information. In the Proposition in Sect. 3.1 we have already seen that 
the availability of information will lead to an increase in social welfare, defined 
by total system benefits minus total system costs. The manner in which this is ac- 
complished is graphically shown in Fig. 4. 
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between the private costs of information, the 
number of informed rivers, the expected link travel costs, and expected welfare. 
For example, a price of information equal to 7r leads to N~ informed rivers, ex- 
pected link travel costs will then be equal to C,, and expected welfare equal to 
W~. The upper panel of Fig. 4 shows the linear demand function for informa- 
tion as given by expression (9), where ZCm~ is the price for which demand is equal 
Costs of information 
r~max 
0: 1 NfN~ 
E[link travel costs] 
C~ 
Cex 
Welfare 
"w 
Wn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
0 1  -N;n 
0 t Nn-r  
Fig. 4. Welfare ffects of endogenous 
information 
0,  N~ r~-~ 
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to zero (see Appendix A.1 for a derivation of 7~max). Then, the middle panel of 
Fig. 4 gives the expected link travel costs (Cen = (1 -p)  C°(N°n)+pC 1(N~n)) as a 
function of the number of informed drivers, which is of course a function of the 
price of information. With linear D and C j (j = 0, 1) curves, it can be shown that 
this relationship is linear as well. Clearly, expected link travel costs run from a 
minimum of Cex (where information is free, so that every one is willing to be in- 
formed) to a maximum of Cn (where information is so expensive that no one is 
willing to be informed). 
Finally, the lower panel of Fig. 4 depicts expected welfare as a function of the 
number of informed drivers, which is a function of the price of information. 
Under the assumptions made it can be shown that this is an increasing convex 
quadratic function, running from a minimum when no one is informed (Wn), to 
a maximum when every one is informed (Wex) (see Appendix A.2 for a formal 
proof). The convexity of the expected welfare curve implies that as the number 
of informed drivers increases, then so does social welfare, and even at an increas- 
ing rate. Three effects are playing a role here. First, as the number of informed 
drivers increases, welfare for the "newly" informed drivers increases. If this were 
not the case, then they would not have bought he information in the first place. 
Second, owing to more informed drivers in the network, the expected link travel 
costs decrease, leading to additional benefits for the uninformed rivers. Finally, 
in the model an increase in the number of informed drivers can only be realised 
when the private costs of information decrease, thereby increasing total welfare. 
4. Regulatory issues 
In the previous ections we have seen that information is not only beneficial to 
the (endogenously) informed drivers, but in addition to the (endogenously) unin- 
formed ones, because the expected link travel costs in the network will decrease 
(see Fig. 3). From economic theory it is well known that such kinds of external 
effects may distort the efficiency of the market system in economic processes. In 
these circumstances, the market outcome without government intervention will 
generally not coincide with the allocation that maximises ocial welfare. Hence, 
the existence of external effects to uninformed rivers renders the issue of sub- 
sidising motorist information systems relevant. In the following sections we will 
use the previously presented model to analyse this in greater detail. First, in 
Sect. 4.1 we will derive the optimal evel of the subsidy on motorist information 
equipment; next (Sect. 4.2), we will extend the scope of the analysis towards a 
situation in which a motorist information system exists in combination with fine 
congestion tolling. Finally, we will compare these two types of policy instruments 
from an efficiency point of view in Sect. 4.3. 
4.L Subsidising information without olling 
The optimal subsidy s for the motorist information equipment, given the price 
of information , can be found by maximising expected welfare subject o indivi- 
dual maximising behaviour: 
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msax (1-  p ) " (7°  D (x ) d x -  C° ( N°en ) " N°n ) 
(~7=D(x)dx_C~ 5 5 ) o5  +p"  (Nen)  "Nen - 7~" (]Men -Nen ) 
subject o 
( t -p) ' (D(N°n)-C°(N°e.))  = u-s  
5 5 5 p ' (C  (Nen)-D(Nen)) = rc-s 0o) 
The two restrictions in (10) ensure that information is allocated in an individually 
rational manner. Furthermore, due to the subsidy s, the costs of information as 
paid for by the users of the information system have decreased from n to n-s .  
Also, note that the objective function is not explicitly dependent on the subsidy 
s, since from a welfare economic point of view, the redistributive impact of the 
subsidy is not relevant for the policy's efficiency. The optimal subsidy s then 
follows from solving the following Lagrangian: 
/NOn 0 0 0 1 1 5 
~=(1-P) ' t !  D(x)dx-C  (Nen)'Nen +p" D(x)dx-C  (Nen)'Nen 
N 
- It" (We 0 -NSen) (11) 
+ 2 o. ((1 -p)" (D(N°en)- C°(N° n))- TO+S) 
+ )t 5. (p. (C ~ (Nlen)_ D (Nien))- ~z + s) 
The five necessary first-order conditions are given by: 
OS 
ONe ° 
05g 
OLf 
Os 
05; 
0,t2 
0 0 0 Or 0 0 - (1 -p) . (D(Nen) -  C (Nen)-C (Nen)'Nen) 
- 7r+~-°'(1-p)'(D'(N°en)-C°'(g°n)) = 0 
1 1 1 5t 1 5 -p ' (D(Nen) -C  (Nen)-C (Nen)'Ne,) 
+ 7r+ 2 5.p. (C l ,(Nlen)_D,(Nlen)) = 0 
-20+25=0 
- (1 -p)"  (D(N°en) - C°(N°n) -  7r+s = 0 
0 LF _ P" (C I (N~n)_D(Nlen) ) -  zr+s = 0 
025 
(12) 
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This set of first-order conditions can be solved to yield the following (implicit) 
expression for the optimal subsidy: 
yl.wO_yO, wl 
s - (13) 
wO q- w 1 
where 
yo (1 -p )  o, o o = "C (Nen)'Ne, 
~i It i 1 = p.  C (Nen)'Nen 
w ° ( l -p )  , 0 0, 0 = • (D (N~) -  C (Ne. ) )  
w I =p.(n'(Nien)-C~'(Nlen)) 
(14) 
For linear demand and cost curves the optimal subsidy can be given explicitly by: 
Nlen(Tr). bl _]~n(Tr). a__~ 
(15) 
s = a+2b o a+2b 1 
( l -p ) . (a+b°)  2 p . (a+bl )  2 
where N J, (re) denotes the equilibrium levels of road usage with a price of infor- 
mation equal to rc and no subsidy (] = 0, 1). 
After substituting NJ~(rc)(j = 0, 1; see Eqs. (7) and (8)) into expression (15), 
it follows that in the model with linear demand and cost curves the optimal sub- 
sidy is an increasing linear function of the price of information re. Hence, the 
higher the price of information, the higher the optimal regulator's subsidy. This 
linear relationship, however, may also imply that the optimal value of the subsidy 
may be negative when the price of the information is relatively low. This then 
leads to the interesting result that it might be welfare increasing to tax rather than 
to subsidise information! At first sight, this may seem a counter-intuitive r sult, 
since we found in previous ections that information provision leads to positive 
external effects to uninformed rivers as well. However, it should be realised that 
information induces more travel in the network, while in order to achieve system 
optimal behaviour in case of congestion, road usage should be reduced. Appa- 
rently, when the optimal subsidy is negative, it is more efficient for the govern- 
ment to use the motorist information system as an instrument to price for conges- 
tion rather than to stimulate the use of information. 
To conclude, the optimal subsidy captures two effects. On the one hand, a 
positive value of the subsidy will induce more drivers to be informed, and hence 
will generate a more efficient use of the network. On the other hand, a negative 
subsidy (a tax) is a kind of (second-best) instrument to price for congestion, and 
hence to reduce overall evels of road usage. The optimal subsidy is a compromise 
between these two effects, and turns out to be more in favour of the latter at a 
relatively low price of information, and more in favour of the former at relatively 
high prices. 
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Using the parameter values from Emmerink et aI. (1994a), a typical situation 
is depicted in Fig. 5.5 With these parameter values, rCma x (the maximum possible 
price of information under which demand for information is still positive, see Ap- 
pendix A.I) is approximately equal to 3.88. 
The linear increasing relationship between the price of information 7~ and the 
optimal subsidy s is given in the upper panel of Fig. 5. The bottom panel depicts 
the mapping between the price of information z~ and expected welfare. Here, we 
have compared expected welfare with and without government intervention toop- 
timally subsidise motorist information systems. Clearly, expected welfare with the 
imposition of the optimal (welfare maximising) subsidy is at least as high as 
without, and both are (of course) identical when the optimal subsidy is equal to 
zero. In the bottom panel of Fig. 5 it is important to note that the difference in 
expected welfare under the two types of regulation isvery small in our model. The 
difference is significant at only relatively low and high prices of information ~. 
A conclusion regarding this point is that (for a wide range of parameter values) 
our model indicates that subsidising information as a tool to achieve a more effi- 
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Fig. 5, The relationship between 
the price of information, sub- 
sidising information, and ex- 
pected welfare 
5 The following parameter values were used to generate Fig. 5: d = 50, a = 0.0/5, k°= k l= 20, 
b ° = 0.015, b 1 = 0.04, andp  = 0.25. 
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cient allocation of road usage may not always be very effective. In Sect. 4.3 we 
will return to this issue by comparing other types of government regulation as 
well. Before doing so, we will first introduce fine (fluctuating) congestion-pricing 
in combination with endogenous information in the next section. 
4.2. Combining fine congestion tolling and subsMising motorist information 
The first-best solution in congested transport networks - the solution that is op- 
timal from a social welfare point of view - can be achieved by implementing a 
fine (i.e. dependent on the level of congestion) congestion pricing scheme. By do- 
ing so, marginal private costs will coincide with marginal social costs, so that in- 
dividually optimal behaviour isalso in line with overall optimality. In order to ob- 
tain these socially desired behavioural responses, it is necessary for all potential 
road users to be perfectly aware of the prevailing level of the fine tolls. Hence, 
some kind of information system is needed to ensure that this first-best policy will 
indeed achieve what it is intended to. Or in other words, proper fine tolling cannot 
be implemented without he simultaneous implementation f some kind of infor- 
mation system. 
In the present section, we will derive the optimal fine congestion tolls (/co: in 
state 0; f l :  in state 1) and the optimal motorist information subsidy s simulta- 
neously, by assuming that cost price of information is equal to n. The present 
analysis is based on earlier work by Verhoef et al. (1994), and it takes properly 
into account the costs of providing information. 
In the model, the government will determine the fine fees f0 and f t ,  and the 
optimal level of the subsidy s in order to maximise xpected social welfare. Hence, 
the regulator faces the following maximisation problem: 
N o 
/ *~' o o \ max (1 -p) '~ ~ D(x)dx-C°(Nen)'Nen) 
f°,f ,s 
+p. D(x)dx-  C I (Nen)'Nen -Nen) 
subject o 
(1 -p)" (D(N°n)- C°(N°.)-f°) = n-s  
p'(Ci(glen)+fi-D(Nlen)) = n-s  
(•6) 
The two restrictions in (16) ensure that individual behaviour is rational, i.e. no in- 
dividual can increase xpected net private benefits by changing behaviour, and 
hence the solution is an equilibrium. Clearly, these restrictions follow directly 
from expressions (5) and (6) after taking proper account of the introduction of 
fine congestion fees f0 and f l  and the subsidy for the motorist information sys- 
tem s. 
The optimal fine fees and subsidy for information can be found by solving 
for the following Lagrangian: 
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) 5¢= ( l -p ) ' (  ~ D(x)dx-C° (N°en) 'N°  n 
0 
1 I I +p. D(x )dx -C  (Nen)'Nen 
- ~.(N°n -N~°)  
+ ~.°.(0 -p  )" (D(N° ) -C°  (N°eD-fO)- 7~ + S) 
+ ,~ 2. (p. (C~ (N~e,)+ f t  -D  (N~D) - ~r+s) 
The seven necessary first-order conditions are given by: 
Os 
o f  1 
OS 
020 
OS 
022 
(l_p).(D(NOen)_CO(NOn) - o, o o - C (Nen)'Nen) 
ON~ 0 
- ~+2°'(1 -p ) ' (D ' (N°n) -C° ' (N° , ) )  = 0 
OA¢ 
=p.(D(N~n)_Cl (N len)_  ,, 1 I - -  C (Nen)'Nen) 
8 N len 
_k Tt.[_ ~1 1, 1 t 1 • p . (C  (Nen) -D  (Nen))=O 
O~ _ 20+21 = 0 
(17) 
= - 20. (1 -p )  = 0 (i8) 
- 2 2 "p  = 0 
- (1 -p ) ' (D(N°en) -C° (N°en) - f ° ) -~+s = 0
_ p.  (C 1 (Nlen)+fl _D(N~n))_  ~+s = 0 
The following expressions for the optimal fine fees and subsidy can be derived: 
fO S 0, 0 0 
= C (Nen) 'Nen  
1-p  
f l  +s  C1 ' I 1 (19) 
= (NeD 'Nen 
P 
There are two equations to solve for three variables, implying that we can fix one 
variable and then solve for the other two. For example, fixing the subsidy at O, 
leads to: 
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f=  O~ 0 0 C (Ne,~)'Ne, 
f l  1, i 1 = C (Nen)'Nen (20) 
The expressions in (20) show that once fine congestion tolling equal to marginal 
external congestion cost takes place, there is no need for subsidising motorist in- 
formation systems. In this case, individuals face the optimal incentives for the 
decision of whether to be informed. Furthermore, it can be seen that these opti- 
mal fine fees are given by the traditional expression reflecting the external costs 
of congestion, i.e., the external costs that the marginal driver imposes on the other 
drivers. 
However, the expressions in (19) also show that there are more (an infinite 
number of) ways to reach the socially optimal evel of road usage. For example, 
when information is subsidised, the corresponding optimal fee in state 0 is 
somewhat larger, and the fee in state 1 is smaller. This can intuitively be explained 
by noting that when information is subsidised, then more drivers are willing to 
be informed. This in turn will imply that more people will be inclined to use the 
network when state 0 prevails, and hence, the fine fee in state 0 will be set at a 
higher level. Similarly, less people will be inclined to use the network in state 1, 
so that the fine fee in state 1 will be smaller. 
An important implication of the above reasoning is that in the model 
presented above, fiat congestion pricing (which means that f0 =f i ,  so that the 
fine is independent of the level of congestion i  a particular state) in combination 
with the optimal subsidy for motorist information equipment (see expression (21) 
for the optimal fiat fee and subsidy) will lead to the social welfare maximising 
solution. Under the additional, and rather weak, assumption that the free flow 
travel costs are identical in both states - C°(0) is equal to C l (0) -,  it can easily 
be proven that the optimal subsidy s corresponding to the fiat fee scheme is always 
C (Nen)Nen minus C (Nen)Nen is always positive, since under this assumption l' ~ ~ 0, 0 0
greater than zero. Therefore, the subsidy will never be a tax. Moreover, the expres- 
sion of the fiat fee in (21) shows that it can be interpreted as the expected external 
congestion costs. 
fo__fl 0, 0 0 1, 1 1 =( l -p ) 'C  (Nen)'Nen+P'C (Nen)'Nen 
s =p ' ( t -p ) ' (C  l' 1 1 0, 0 0 (Ne.) 'Ne. -C (Nen)'Ne.) (21) 
The reason that the combination of a flat fee and a subsidy is as efficient as fine 
tolling is of course closely related to the fact that the subsidy is in equilibrium 
only enjoyed by actors using the network in state 0. It therefore nables the 
regulator to discriminate perfectly between actors for whom it is efficient o use 
the network only in state 0, and those for whom it is efficient o use it in both 
states. 
Furthermore, it can be shown that all the available welfare maximising 
strategies, as given by the expressions in (19), lead to the same expected net private 
benefits for the actors (the uninformed rivers, the informed drivers, and the 
regulator) in the system. This follows from the fact that the expected net private 
benefits for all actors in the system are independent of the optimal subsidy s. 
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Hence, the subsidy on information cannot be used by the regulator to influence 
the equity distribution among actors under a first-best policy. 
The results obtained above cannot easily be generalised tomore complex net- 
works and more states of nature. For instance, in a one-link three-state ransport 
network, the optimal flat fee and optimal subsidy on information will not yield 
the system optimum, since in that particular situation there are only two instru- 
ments (the flat fee and the subsidy) to deal with three different traffic situations. 
However, in Verhoef et al. (1994) in a two-link network, it was shown that the 
combination of information provision and flat tolling is a rather obust instru- 
ment, and worked out to be almost as good as the theoretically first-best option 
of fine tolling. Moreover, given the public and political opposition to fine conges- 
tion-pricing, flat pricing in combination with subsidising information may be an 
attractive policy option. 6 
In the next section, we will compare the welfare ffects of the first-best regula- 
tory pricing and information scheme discussed above with the second-best policy 
as presented in Sect. 4.1. 
10,000 
9,000 
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5,000 
4,000 I I 
I 2 3 4 
Price of information 
--a-- first best (fine tolling, subsidy) + second best (subsidy) 
- -  non intervention ~ no information 
Fig. 6. Relationship between the price of information and welfare 
6 See for arguments pro and contra congestion-pricing Johansson and Mattsson (1995). Further- 
more, for empirical evidence that suggests public aversion against pricing in a fluctuating manner, see 
the arguments in Frey and Pommerehne (1993). These authors found that a price rise due to a non- 
recurrent shock (such as a sudden excess in demand) is considered unfair by 80 percent of the 
respondents in their survey. 
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4.3. Efficiency of regulation 
The welfare effects of four different policies will be compared. As previously, well 
fare is defined as total system benefits minus total system costs. The four policies 
to be compared are: 
- first-best: the regulator sets optimal fine tolls; the price of information is ~z; 
- second best: there are no tolls, but the regulator sets optimal subsidy on infor- 
mation; the price of information is re; 
- non intervention: the regulator does not intervene, but information is available 
at a price re; 
- no information: the regulator does not intervene, and information is not avail- 
able. 
In Fig. 6, the impacts of these four policy options on welfare are depicted as a 
function of the price of information, using the same parameter values as in 
Sect. 4.1. 
Clearly, the curve labelled no information is independent of the price of infor- 
mation, and is therefore a horizontal line. The non intervention curve crosses the 
no information one at 7Tma x (~3.88) ,  since there are no informed actors at this 
price of information. Next, notice that, as in Fig. 5, the impact of subsidising in- 
formation (without fine toiling) is negligible. Finally, it is important to note that 
welfare can be increased quite substantially under first-best ransport policy (op- 
timal fine tolls and no subsidy, or optimal flat toll and optimal subsidy). As 
argued in Verhoef et al. (1994), information provision without some kind of con- 
gestion pricing will in most cases not direct the traffic flows towards a level that 
is close to the system optimum. 
5.  Conc lud ing  comments  
In this paper, we have analysed the impact of the endogenous provision of infor- 
mation to potential road users in transport networks. To do so, a static economic 
equilibrium model was used, which allowed potential road users to buy informa- 
tion on the prevailing stochastic traffic situation. An individual driver will acquire 
information, only if the private benefits of being informed exceed the private 
costs. Then, uninformed potential road users base their trip-making behaviour n 
the expected costs, while informed ones use the actual costs. 
By comparing this model with the one in which no information is available, 
it was proven that the endogenous provision of information leads to a strict 
Pareto improvement. The size of this increase in social welfare depends trongly 
on the private costs of information. When the private costs of information de- 
crease, then more actors are willing to be informed, which in turn decreases ex- 
pected link travel costs and increases ocial welfare. 
Next, given a certain price of information, the optimal subsidy was derived, 
i.e. the subsidy that maximises ocial welfare. It was found that the optimal sub- 
sidy increases with the price of information. However, the optimal subsidy can 
be negative when the information is very cheap. Then, it is from a government 
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point of view more efficient o use the motorist information system as an instru- 
ment to price for congestion rather than to stimulate a more efficient use of the 
network. In both situations, however, it was shown that the potential welfare im- 
provement of subsidising (or taxing) information is relatively small. 
The analysis of the relation between fine congestion pricing and subsidising 
motorist information revealed that there is no rationale to subsidise information 
as long as the government implements a proper fine congestion-pricing scheme. 
However, subsidising information may become an attractive (and necessary) 
policy option when a flat pricing scheme is adopted. 
In the present paper we have assumed that the price of information is indepen- 
dent of the number of informed drivers. However, it may be more realistic to 
describe the costs of a motorist information system by a fixed cost component, 
reflecting the necessary equipment needed to provide information (for instance, 
road-side quipment or a central computer system), and a variable cost compo- 
nent, representing the costs of the in-vehicle unit (for instance, the on-board com- 
puter system). Such a cost structure would imply the existence of economies of 
scale. In future research, this deserves some attention, as it might influence the 
results. 
Appendix A 
A.1 Proof of Proposition 
Proposition. In a one-link network with endogenised demand for information, 
and assuming linear demand (D) and cost (C °, C 1) functions, C°(N)<_CI (N), 
and dC° (N)/dN <_dCt (N)/dN, the following relationships hold: 
@ (a) expected road usage is higher with information than without; 
• (b) expected link travel costs are smaller with information than without; 
@ (c) expected welfare is higher with information than without. 
Proof In the following we will assume that the linear demand curve D can be 
written as D(N) = d -aN,  and the linear cost curves as CJ(N) = kJ+b/N for 
/=0 ,1 .  
First, we will derive the maximum possible price of information under which 
demand is non-negative. In state 0, this price 0 (7~max) can  be found by equating 
Ne ° and N,. Using expression (7) in Sect. 3.1 it follows that: 
7~ max0 = (NOex_Nn).(1 _p).(aq_b O) (1) 
A similar reasoning for state 1 yields: 
1 1 1) = -Nex) max (Nn "p" (a + b (2) 
Using the explicit formulas for N n, N°x, it can easily be shown that 0 7~ max = 
7rlmax(= ZCma×). Next, we will prove Proposition (a). First, using the equilibrium 
condition of model n (no information available), it follows that: 
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N n = D -1 ((1 --p)" CO(Nn)+p" C ~ (Nn)) . (3) 
Then, using the equilibrium conditions of model en (endogenous demand for in- 
formation) and the linearity of the demand function of road usage D, it can be 
shown that: 
e(g~. )  = o 1 (1 -p)"Nen +p'Nen = D -1((1 -p)" C°(E(Nen))+p" C ~ (E(Nen)) 
+(1 -p ) 'p  o ~ o • (Nen -Nen)" (b - b 1)) (4) 
Since o ~ b o b 1 Nen-Nen is positive, and - negative, it follows that: 
A = (1 -p) 'p ' (N°en-N len) ' (b° -b l )<O . (5) 
Writing x = E(Ne,,) and y = Nn, we have obtained the relationships: 
x = D-1 ((1 -p ) 'C° (x )+p 'C l (x )+A)  
y = D -i  ((1 -p ) .  C°(y)+p • C 1 (y)) (6) 
Since A is smaller than zero, and D-  1 is a decreasing function, it follows that x 
is greater than y. Hence, Proposition (a) holds true. 
Next, since A is smaller than zero, Proposition (b) also holds true. 
Finally, we will prove Proposition (c). We will do so by showing that welfare 
does positively depend on squared (expected) road usage. For the model without 
information (model n) this was proven in Emmerink et al. (1995b). Next, 
rewriting the expressions of the model in which information is endogenised 
(model en) we find: 
CO(NeOn) = D(NOen ) n (7) 
1 -p  
and 
C l (Nlen) = D(Nlen)+ ~ (8) 
P 
Expected welfare is given by: \/N°" ) 
E(Welfare) = ( l -p ) - (  ~ D(x)dx-C°(N°en)'NOen 
0 
/g~. ~ 1 ~ ~ o +p'~ ~ D(x)dx -C  (Nen) 'Nen/-~'(Nen-Nen) 
22 1 -p , /  \2  P l  
- n" (NO _Nen ) , = 1. a'E(N2e.) (9) 
2 
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where the last equality follows from the substitution f expressions (7) and (8) in 
expression (9). Proposition (c) now follows from applying Proposition (a). This 
completes the proof of Proposition. 
A.2. Demand for information, expected link travel costs and social welfare 
Under the assumptions of linear demand for travel (D (N) = d -aN)  and linear 
link travel cost functions (Ci(N) = k i +biN), it was shown in Sect. 3.t that de- 
mand for information is linearly dependent on the private costs of being in- 
formed. Here we will prove that under these conditions expected link travel costs 
are also a linear function of demand for information. Expected link travel costs 
in the model with endogenous demand for information are given by: 
(l-p)'C°(N°en)+P'Cl(N~n) = (1 -p ) .C  ° ° x ( l _p)~a+b o
+p.C ~ ~ p.( b 
(o 
Constant+n- \(a+bO).(a+bl)/] , where (10) 
Constant = (1 -p ) .  k 0 +p.  k i + (1 -p ) .  b O.NO +p. b 1. N~ex 
Hence, the private costs of information and the expected link travel costs are 
positively linearly dependent. Now, since demand for information and private 
costs of information  are negatively linearly dependent, it follows that the ex- 
pected link travel costs are negatively linearly dependent on demand for informa- 
tion. 
Finally, we will show that social welfare, as defined by total system benefits 
minus total system costs, is a convex quadratic increasing function of demand for 
information. We will do so by showing that the first derivative of welfare with 
respect o private costs of information is negative, while the second derivative 
of welfare with respect to private costs of information  is positive, and the third 
derivative is equal to zero. 
0 Welfare 
On 
0 Welfare ON°n + 0 Welfare ONeln 
ONe°n On ON~n On 
1 o a'(Nen'(a+b°)-Nen'(a+bl)) <O 
(a+b°).(a+b 1)
(11) 
This expression is negative because N~n is smaller than 0 b 0 Nen, and is smaller 
than b ~. 
02,Vel re o ( 1 1 )  
07~ 2 (1-p) ' (a+b°)  2 +p.(a+b 1) >0 (12) 
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0 3 Welfare 
-0  (13) 
Hence,  welfare is a convex quadrat i c  decreasing funct ion  o f  the pr ivate costs o f  
being in fo rmed n. Now, since the demand funct ion  for in fo rmat ion  is negat ively 
l inear ly dependent  on n, it fo l lows that  welfare is a convex quadrat i c  increasing 
funct ion  o f  the number  o f  in fo rmed drivers. 
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